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ABSTRACT
It is widely thought that increases in corporate mergers and
acquisitions of the sort which the United States has experienced in the
recent past lead to a reduction in such longterm investment activities
as R&D because of a shortened horizon on the part of managers. This
paper uses a newly created dataset containing all acquisitions of
publicly traded firms in the manufacturing sector in the last ten years
to answer some basic questions which pertain to this issue. I find that
the firms involved in acquisitions and mergers where both partners are
in the manufacturing sector have roughly the same pattern of R&D
spending as the sector as a whole and that the acquisition itself does
not cause a reduction in R&D activity on the part of these firms.
Moreover, the R&D capital thus acquired is valued more highly by the
acquiring firm than by the stock market. On the other hand, I also find
that the substantial increase in the number and size of acquisitions
made by privately held firms in the eighties is concentrated primarily
on firms with low R&D intensity which also are in non-R&D intensive
industries. Because the pattern of low investment in R&D is
longstanding, and because the firms taken over have less rather than
more R&D capital than the industry as a whole, it seems unlikely that
the recent increase in takeover activity has had a significantly
negative effect on R&D spending in these industries.
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Economists generally agree that research and development activity
is an important factor in the long-term growth of the economy. The
purpose of this paper is to explore the effects, possibly deleterious,
of the recent increase in takeover activity in the U. S. corporate
sector on the level and pattern of research activity. R&D is
interesting in this context because it is a decision variable for the
firm which is viewed as "long-term" in nature -- ifa wave of mergers
distracts managers from all but shortrun activity, we might expect that
R&D performance would cease to be optimal.
This paper uses evidence on the observed characteristics of the
mergers which actually take place in order to shed some light on this
topic. It explores the factors which determine the probability of an
1. I am grateful to Zvi Griliches and Timothy Bresnahan for ongoing
discussions, to Alan Auerbach, Charlie Brown, Lawrence Lau, Tom Macurdy,
Ariel Pakes, and John Shoven for comments at various times during this
research, and to Chris Hall for help with the data collection. Comments
by seminar participants at Stanford University, University of Santa
Clara, Boston University, Harvard University, MIT, University of
Chicago, and University of California at Berkeley were also helpful in
preparing this revision. Some of this work was done while I was a Sloan
Dissertation Fellow and a John M. Olin graduate research fellow, and I
thank these foundations for their support. The data preparation effort
was partially supported by a National Science Foundation Grant (PRA 81-
08635) and by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
2acquisition as well as the valuation of these factors at the time of
takeover in order to quantify the role of R&D in acquiring and acquired
firms. For this purpose, I build a simple model for acquisition choice
which is tractable for estimation and captures the idea that there is
heterogeneity across firms and therefore unique synergies to a merger:
different targets are worth different amounts to acquiring firms and the
highest valuer is most likely to make the acquisition.
The question of whether increased merger activity is a good thing
for the economy in general remains unresolved and is not likely to be
resolved by focusing purely on the experience of the firms involved.
There is the view of Jensen (1986) and others that merger activity
represents an unambiguously positive shifting of assets into their best
use and provides the best mechanism for ensuring that managers act in
the shareholders' interest. A more neutral view would hold that the
level of merger activity is just a byproduct of this asset shuffling and
has no particular externality; it fluctuates from time to time in just
the same way as the number of shares traded on the stock market
fluctuates from day to day. The negative view, associated with Scherer
(1984), sees acquired entities (lines of business in his empirical work)
as almost always suffering declining profitability after merging, and
infers from this result the conclusion that increased acquisition
activity is likely to be a wasteful thing for the economy as a whole.
Roll (1986) essentially provides an efficient financial markets
explanation of the phenomenon observed by Scherer, although that was not
his specific aim: He argues that we only see transactions where the
management of acquiring firms misperceives the value of the target firm
as too low, and hence that even under efficient markets, we get more
negative surprises than positive. This picture of acquisition activity
3implies that an increase in mergers is associated with an increase in
corporate "hubris" (his term) which is not good for the economy as a
whole. However, for this view to hold in the presence of efficient
markets, the offer made by an acquiring firm should be associated with a
fall in its share price, since shareholders should be capable of
inferring that the decision to buy is likely to be a bad one. The
existing evidence on bidding firm returns does not seem really
consistent with this.
Is merger activity likely to have a negative effect on R&D
performance?One reason it might is substitution: if firms with large
amounts of cash would rather spend it than return it to shareholders in
the form of dividends, we would expect R&D and acquisition to be
substitutes for these firms.An increase in the attractiveness of
acquisition opportunities would depress spending on internal investment,
including R&D. They may be substitutes on the real side also: there
are two ways to acquire knowledge capital, either by investment within
the firm (an R&D program) or by purchasing another firm after its R&D
program has yielded successful results. The latter strategy has the
advantage that more information is available about the output of the
R&D, which tends to be higly uncertain. Under the two assumptions of no
scale economies or diseconomies in R&D over the relevant range and
perfect capital markets, the two strategies should be perfect
substitutes for the firm.
Alternatively, the view that some acquisitions are used as Itcash
cows" to service the debt incurred in order to finance them also implies
a negative effect on R&D activity: an easy way to increase short-term
cash flows at the expense of long-term profits is to cut spending on
4such things as R&D. However, evidence that this indeed takes place in
the instances we observe is not evidence that it is the wrong thing to
do: the longrun profit rate may not have been high enough to justify
the pre-merger R&D level of the acquired firm, and cutting it may be
precisely what a now presumably better management should do.
There is some evidence on a few of these questions: Using roughly
the same data as mine, Addanki found no support for the hypothesis that
firms with larger R&D programs were attractive acquisition prospects.
If anything, innovators were less likely to be acquired. An SEC study
(1985) found that firms which were taken over invest less in R&D than
other firms in their industry, although they did not control for size,
which could account for some of the result. The same study produced a
related piece of evidence on the market valuation of long term
investments such as R&D: the 20 day excess return for an announcement
of an increased level of R&D was 1.8 percent, suggesting that the market
placed a positive value on such announcements.
On the other hand, for a sample of 1337 Industrial File firms in
1976, of which 301 were acquired by 1983,I found that once I had
controlled for Tobin's q at the beginning of the period, the R&D to
assets ratio was positively related to the probability of being
acquired. The coefficient was consistent with a shadow price for the
R&D capital stock of around 0.6 times that for the physical capital
stock of the firm. In other words, firms for which the measured ratio of
market value to book value was high because they also had intangible
assets such as a large R&D program, were more likely to exit from the
sample by merger, ceteris paribus. In this version of the probability
model, I did control for size, so the R&D effects would not be
confounded by the negative correlation between the size of the firm and
5its R&D intensity. However the coefficient was rather imprecisely
measured, and results tended to be sensitive to the exact choice of
sample (whether or not the sample included firms traded Over-the-
Counter, for example).
In this paper, I investigate these somewhat inconsistent results on
the attractiveness of R&D-doing firms as takeover candidates further, as
well as exploring some of the other issues related to R&D performance
and takeover activity. To this end I assemble a dataset on all the
publicly traded U.S. manufacturing firms which were acquired between the
years 1976 and 1986, and examine the pattern of acquisition and merger:
were the acquired firms more or less R&D intensive than others in their
industry? What were the characteristics of the acquiring firms and what
kinds of synergy favored the merger?I also examine what happened to
the R&D of the new larger firm, to see if there is any evidence that the
acquisitions take place partly to reduce R&D expenditures because of
scale economies or other reasons. Finally, is there any evidence that
winners (successful innovators) were being picked by the mergers and
acquisitions process, suggesting that this is how successful innovators
capture the appropriate rate of return?
2. Modelling the Acquisition Decision
My approach to modelling takeover activity views such activity as
a response to changes in states of the world (such as technology shocks)
which make some assets less productive in their current use than in
some alternative use. Because of information lags, transactions costs,
or whatever, these assets do not move continuously into their optimal
use, so the shocks induce a disequilibrium which is resolved by the
6purchase of discrete bundles of assets by other firms. In other words,
merger activity is the result of the rearrangement of productive assets
in response to changes in the available technology, or, in the case of
the domestic manufacturing sector, to changes in the nature and level of
competition from the rest of the world.2
1gin by denoting the value of the assets of a particular firm as
V(X) —V(X1,X2,...),where X is a vector of characteristics of the firm,
such as capital stock, R&D stock, industry, tax characteristics, and so
forth.The value function V can be thought of as the present
discounted value of the revenue streams which could be generated from
these assets either alone or in combination with other assets. For the
moment, I do not necessarily identify V(X.) with the current stock
market value of the firm, although in a world with fully informed
rational shareholders and efficient markets, V(X) would of necessity be
the price at which this bundle of assets traded. The reason I do not
make this assumption here is the well-known fact that acquisitions take
place a a significant positive premium over pre-announcement stock
market value (Jensen and Ruback (1983) and the references therein),
which implies that some agents place a higher value on than the
market. Thus it would be a mistake to impose at the outset a constraint
that the market for corporate assets is in a fully-informed equilibrium,
2. An additional reason for changes in merger activity might be changes in
the transactions or other costs associated with buying another firm. For
example, Jensen (1986) has suggested that the innovation of junk bonds
facilitates takeovers by small entities of large firms which would not
previously have taken place. In my investigation here, I am abstracting
somewhat from the changes in takeover technology which have occured in
the recent past, since they primarily affect things in the time series
dimension, and my focus is on cross sectional differences and
similarities among takeovers.
7since it is the disequilibria which drive the acquisition process. The
implications of this assumption for the estimation strategy will be
clarified after I present the model.
I assume that each period (a year in my data), the optimal
configuration of corporate assets changes due to shocks to the economic
environment. Acquiring firms are subscripted j, and possible targets,
which consist of my entire sample of firms, are subscripted i. Each
firm in my sample can acquire any other firm; if it does so, then the
increment to the value of the acquiring firm j due to the new
configuration of assets is denoted V(X). Assuming for the moment that
only one acquisition is possible per period, firm j will buy firm i





where P1 is the price he will have to pay for i's assets. The last
condition ensures that there is a positive gain from the acquisition;
many potential acquirers will find that it holds for none of the targets
and hence will acquire no firms during the period.
Equation (1) is similar to the equations which define product
choice by a consumer in a Random Utility Choice model (McFadden (1973),
Manski and McFadden (1981) and references therein). To see this, think
of the asset aggregation function (V's) in this model as analogous to
consumer utility expressed as a function of the underlying (Lancastrian)
characteristics of the good. Thus the market for acquisitions resembles
the market for differentiated products, with one important difference:
8in the consumer demand literature, price enters the indirect utility
function directly, since the consumers are assumed to be price-takers.
In this market, one cannot assume that the price firm j will pay for the
assets is independent of his attempt to purchase them. The empirical
evidence is that by making a bid, firm j reveals something about the
value of the assets which was not previously known and hence finds it
necessary to bid above the current trading price. In a companion piece
Hall (l987b) I derive the equilibrium price in a market with a large
finite number of unique differentiated buyers and sellers and show that
it will lie somewhere between the value of the good to the highest
valuer and the next highest valuer. In the econometric work here, I
assume that the price at which the potential acquirers will evaluate the
purchase is not P, the current trading price of firm i's stock, but an
unobservable V(X.), which is a function of the assets X..
1 1
The advantage of viewing the acquisition decision in this way is
that there exists a large body of literature on the econometric
estimation of models of the demand for differentiated products in terms
of their characteristics, on which we can build in order to describe the
types of mergers which take place and how the characteristics of targets
are valued by different acquirers. Although I frequently use the
language of consumer demand to describe the acquisition decision
throughout this paper, it should be kept in mind that because price is
not exogenous, what is actually being estimated can be interpreted
instead as an equation determining the gains from particular mergers,
where the buyers and sellers are treated symmetrically, rather than an
equation describing the demand of an acquiring firm for a target.
An estimating equation is derived from the conditions in equation
(1) by partitioning the gain to firm j from the acquisition into
9observable and unobservable components:
(2) V.(X.) -P.—f(X.X.) +..
31 1 13 13
andletting ..havean extreme value distribution. If the .. 'sare
13 3.3
independently distributed across alternative, then one obtains the usual
multinominal logit probability that an acquisition will take place:
exp(f(X. ,X.))
(3) P(j buys iC) —______________________________
exp(f(X.,XK))
kEG
where C is the entire pool of firms. The likelihood function is formed
by multiplying these probabilities and conditioning on the observed
characteristics of the acquirers and potential targets.3
At this point the alert reader will notice that the choice set C is
very large: potentially it includes any firm within or without the
United States. Even if I confine the choice set to my dataset, it
consists of more than 2000 firms, which raises questions as to the
feasibility of econometric estimation and the validitiy of the hA
3. As was suggested by one of the discussants of this paper, Ariel Pakes,
it is possible to reverse this model by viewing the decision from the
perspective of the potential target. In this case the coefficients of
the gain function are estimated from a comparison of the actual acquirer
to those firms which might have acquired the target. If the
specification is correct, and the c. .'sare truly independent, both
methods should give the same estimas of the structural parameters. A
full exploration of the econometric specification of such a model,
although interesting, is beyond the scope of the current paper. Work
now underway on this topic suggests that differential propensities to be
acquired or to make an acquisition (that is, lack of independence of the
alternatives) may have a role here.
10assumption. Fortunately, McFadden (1978) has considered the large
choice set problem and suggested two approaches for dealing with it.
The first solution is to construct a nested logit model, which describes
the choice from 2000 alternatives as a hierarchical sequence of choices
each of which considers vastly fewer alternatives. For example, I might
hypothesize that firms choose the industry in which they wish to make an
acquisition first, and then choose among firms in that industry. This
solution requires more a priori information, but has the advantage that
it gets around the hA problem somewhat.I have not chosen to use this
model in my initial exploration of the data, since I wished to avoid
imposing too much structure on the choice problem at the outset.
The second solution to the problem of very large choice sets
suggested by McFadden is simpler to implement, although possibly not the
most powerful or realistic in terms of its assumptions: One randomly
samples from the unchosen alternatives and includes only a subset for
each observation. McFadden shows that as long as the sampling algorithm
has what he calls the "uniform conditioning property" and the choice
probabilities satisfy the hA assumption, estimates obtained using the
subset of alternatives and a conventional multinomial logit program are
consistent. The uniform conditioning property is defined as
(4) If i,j Dc C, then ir(DIi,z) —,r(Dj,z)
where D is the subset of alternatives used, itisthe probability
distribution used to draw D from C, and z are the exogenous variables of
the model. The algorithm which I used to generate my subsets D has this
property, since my D consists of the chosen (numerator) alternative
augmented by a random sample selected from the other alternatives. The
size of D which I used was seven, but this is obviously an area where
11more experience and experimentation would be desirable.
For the econometric estimation of the model in equations (2) and
0), I need to specify a functional form for f(X.,X.). The difficulty
with this function as written is that the gains from different
acquisitions are likely to have extremely heteroskedastic and possibly
nononormal disturbances due to the large size range of the firms in
the dataset.4 I would like to choose a specification that
mitigates this problem as much as possibly, since the multinomial logit
estimates will be biased in this case. My solution to the problem is to
specify the acquisition choice problem in terms of rates of return to
acquisitions rather than total gains; this implies a condition of the
form
(5) V.(X)/P. > V.(X.)/P
ratherthan equation (6). By using a multiplicative disturbance for the
value functions and then taking logarithms, I arrive at the following
estimating equation for the econometric model:
4. In data of this kind, with a skew size distribution, the functional form
which typically has disturbances which are normally distributed is the
log-log. For example, consider the form
logy —+ 1logX+c,
If we choose instead to estimate using V, we obtain
V—e X e A0X (l+e)
by a first order Taylor series expansion; this disturbance is clearly
very heteroskedastic (and skew).
12exp(v. (X.)v(X))




where the lower case v denotes the measurable component of the logarithm
of the valuation function. The subscripted v denotes the valuation from
the perspective of the acquiring firm, whereas v without a subscript is
the function which describes the equilibrium price at which the firm's
assets will trade.
For the econometric estimation, I model the logarithm of V as a
function of firm characteristics including the logarithm of the capital
stock, R&D intensity, and the two-digit industry. The exact functional
form I use is motivated partly by a simple intertemporal optimizing
model of a firm with a given stock of assets A, and partly by a desire
for tractability and interpretability of the estimating equation. A
Cobb-Douglas price-taking firm with one type of capital for which there
are adjustment costs, and with all other inputs freely variable has a
value function
(8) V(A) —a0Aa
as a result of maximizing present discounted cash flow, where o is a
scale parameter which is equal to unity in the constant returns case
(Lucas and Prescott (1971), Mussa (1974), Abel (1983,1985)). In the
absence of a good model for the value function of more than one kind of
capital (see Wildasin (1984)), I incorporate a second capital, knowledge
capital K, by the simple expedient of aggregating it with A, but with a
freely varying coefficient:
13(9) V(A,K) —a0(A+YK)a —a0A° (l+y(K/A))U
Taking logarithms,
(10) v(A,K)a logA +alog(l+-y(K/A)) a logA +ay(K/A)
Thus the coefficient of size in my estimating equation can be
interpreted as a scale coefficient and that of R&D intensity as
representing a premium (or discount) which the R&D capital receives in
the market over that of ordinary capital. Of course, in order to
interpret the R&D coefficient in this way, one must be careful to
measure K and A in comparable stock units.
Using the basic underlying model for the valuation of the assets of
the firms, I capture the synergy of combining the two firms in two
different ways. The first models the gain from the acquisition, v.,(X..)
-v(X.)as a linear function of the assets of the two firms and the





where the X variables are the vector of variables describing the assets
of the firm in question (for example, log A and (K/A)). Because of
the form of the multinominal logit probability, the coefficients of the
acquiring firm's characteristics, ,willnot be estimable since they
cancel from the numerator and denominator, so that only X and (X -
X.)2will enter the logit equation in this case. In any case these
coefficients will contain both terms from v(X.) and the linear terms
from v.(X.).31
Thesecond method for modelling the synergistic relationship
between the two firms starts from the notion that each acquiring firm
14has a value v.(X.) for the target firm i which is a different function
of firm i's characteristics, so that
(12) v.(X.)
J1311,1
Ithen model the "shadow prices" -y. as linear functions of the
characteristics of firm j. This will imply that cross products of the
variables for firm j and firm i enter the equation for the probability
of a choice. The advantage of this formulation is that it allows us to
place a valuation interpretation on the estimated coefficients; in other
words, the -y. estimates are hedonic prices of the characteristics X.
3. Data and Sample Statistics
The data from which I draw my sample consist of 2519 manufacturing
firms on the Industrial and Over-the-Counter Compustat tapes which
existed sometime during the 1976 to 1985 period. The basic features of
the 1976 based subset of this sample were described in Bound et al
(1984) and Cummins et al (1986) and the construction of the whole
sample is described in Hall (l987a). It consists of a rolling panel of
firms, with annual data available as far back as 1959 for some firms;
all firms are followed as long as they remain publicly traded and
therefore in the Compustat files, with the last year of coverage being
1985. The number of firms actually in the sample in any one year
declines from a high of about 2000 in 1976 to around 1500 in 1985.
I used four sources of information in order to identify the reasons
for exit of the approximately 900 firms which were not in the file as of
1985 as well as the name of the acquiring firm for all acquisitions:
the FTC Merger Reports of 1977 through 1980, a list of around 400
15acquisitions involving Compustat firms supplied to me by Auerbach and
Reishus (for more detail see Auerbach and Reishus (1986)), the Directory
of Obsolete Securities (1986), and the Standard and Poor Corporate
records, which provide news reports indexed by firm name every year for
the entire period in question. This yielded a complete breakdown of the
reasons for exit: of the 875 firms which exited the sample by 1985, 601
were acquired, 94 went bankrupt or were liquidated, 115 underwent a name
change (and should have the data for the new entity restored to the
file), 45 were reorganized (the capital structure was changed
significantly enough so that it was reported in the Directory of
Obsolete Securities), and 20 exits remain unexplained.
After splicing together the records for firms whose names had
changed (e.g., U. S. Steel became USX Corp), and also those for firms
whose CUSIPs changed because of reorganization, I updated this
distribution of exits and searched out the remaining unexplained exits.
The final tabulation is shown in Table 1 by year of exit. The most
striking fact in this table is the well-known one that the rate of
acquisition has risen from the late seventies into the eighties (note
that my numbers for 1986 are undoubtedly incomplete). In addition, a
large part of the increase in the acquisition rate between the 1976-1981
period and the 1982-1986 period is due to the increase in acquisition
activity by privately held and foreign firms. Weighted by employment,
these acquisitions have tripled, while the acquisitions by publicly
traded firms have increased by one third. In this case, privately held
means acquisition by a firm which does not file 10-Ks with the SEC on a
regular basis and is therefore not in our sample; some of these are
leveraged buyout by management or other investors ("taking the firm
private").
16Because the non-publicly traded acquirers perform roughly half the
acquisitions, and these acquisitions are likely to be a nonrandom sample
(for example, they are on average about fifty to sixty percent as
large), throughout the paper I will try to compare results for my
subsample of acquisitions with those for the whole sample.
Unfortunately, it is not in general possible to obtain data on the pre
and post-acquisition experience of these acquirers, which is a
limitation of this study.
Some simple statistics on all the acquisitions are presented in
Table 2a, where I show the industrial breakdown for the firms in the
manufacturing sector in 1976 and 1981 and for the subset which were
acquired between the two periods 1977 to 1981 and 1982 to 1986. To give
an idea of the relative importance of acquisition activity by industry,
I also report the total employment in these firms. Judging by the
fraction of an industry's employees which were affected by acquisition,
the industries with the greatest activity are Food, Textiles, and
Electrical Machinery. In fact, over a third of the employees in the
manufacturing sector subject to takeover were in these three industries.
The other industries with a substantial number of employees involved in
acquisitions are Rubber and plastics, Fabricated metals, and Machinery.
There does not seem to be much of a pattern, except when we look at the
second period. There, the industries with the largest acquisition share
seem to be the older, perhaps somewhat technologically backward
industries which are in the process of upgrading to meet foreign
competition. Is the acquisition activity in these industries primarily
oriented toward consolidation and shrinkage of the industry, or is there
also an attempt to buy smaller firms in the industry which have been
17successful innovators? I will defer this question until we examine the
R&D to sales ratios of the stayers and exiters.
Out of the approximately 600 firms that were acquired, I was able
to identify 342 that were acquired by firms on the Industrial or OTC
Compustat files; of these, there are about 320 for which I have good
data on both acquiree and acquirer. This excludes any which were
acquired by foreign firms, as well as those acquired by privately held
firms. It does include nonmanufacturing firms which acquired firms in
the manufacturing sector.The characteristics of the subset for which
I have data on the acquirer are given in Table 2b. Although they
account for only half the acquisitions made during this period, they
have two-thirds of the employees involved in acquisitions (two million
out of three million). I also show the industrial distribution of the
firms which are doing the acquiring; there are fewer firms in this
column since some make more than one acquisition during the period.
Table 2b makes it clear that there is no overwhelming pattern to
the merger and acquisition activity: the distribution by industry of
acquirers and acquirees is quite different, but not in a particularily
meaningful way. The largest share of firms were taken over in the
Aircraft, Machinery, and Electrical machinery industries, while the
Aircraft, Electrical Machinery, and Petroleum industries had the largest
share of firms performing acquisitions. This last fact is a consequence
of the fact that these industries are also the ones with the largest
number of employees per firm on average.
In Tables 3a and 3b, I investigate the differences in R&D intensity
between exiting firms and those which remain in the industry, and then
between acquiring firms and those firms which they acquire. For those
firms which are acquired by firms in the publicly traded manufacturing
18sector, the difference in R&D intensity between acquired firms and
stayer firms is insignificantly different from zero for the whole
manufacturing sector and for each industry taken separately. Only in
Primary and Fabricated metals is there a suggestion that the exiting
firms are doing slightly more R&D than those which stay. There is no
evidence that the dominant pattern is either a weeding out of firms
which are technologically backward, or a culling of successful R&D
projects.
However, the firms acquired by private companies or by foreign
firms do have significantly lower R&D intensity than those acquired by
the manufacturing sector: one percent on average rather than two
percent. This pattern persists throughout the whole period; it is not a
consequence of the rise in private buyouts in the latter part. It occurs
partly because these acquisitions tend to take place in the less R&D
intensive, more slowly growing industries such as textiles: with only
one exception, the petroleum industry, the industries with less than
average R&D intensity are those where private and foreign acquisitions
are a larger than average share of all acquisitions. These industries,
which contain half the firms in the sample, account for seventy percent
of the acquisitions by private or foreign companies. This suggests that
the recent increase in acquisition activity due to leveraged buyouts or
other such private purchases is more or less orthogonal to the R&D
activity in manufacturing. Even if all such purchases resulted in the
complete cessation of R&D adtivity by the firm, this would amount to
only around 500 million 1982 dollars a year compared to expenditures on R&D
by the manufacturing sector of approximately 40 billion 1982 dollars per
year.
19When I examine the firms actually doing the acquiring, there does
seem to be a suggestion that R&D intensity is lower in the surviving
firms; the firms being taken over have on average a higher R&D to sales
ratio than the ones which take them over. However, this is primarily
due to the 38 non-manufacturing takeovers of manufacturing firms which
occurred, and we expect that in this case, the firms are being combined
with an entity that may do considerably less R&D in its non-
manufacturing lines of business. At the industrial level, it is
difficult to draw any strong conclusions owing to the relatively small
samples.
The columns labelled R/S in Tables 3a and 3b are an attempt to
answer the question of what happens to the R&D program of the combined
firm after an acquisition has taken place. tR/S for Stayers is the
average two-year change in R&D intensity over the period for the firms
in the industry. oR/S for Exiters is the two year change in R&D
intensity around the time of acquisition for the firms involved in the
acquisition classified by the acquired firms industry. In Table 3b the
same quantity appears, classified by the acquiring firms industry. The




where i,j index the two firms involved. The conclusions are not changed
by restricting attention to those acquisitions where both R and R are
non-zero, so the numbers presented are for all firms.
The individual industry numbers are difficult to interpret, owing
to the imprecision with which they are estimated, although there do seem
to be some significant increases in R&D around acquisition time,
particularly in textiles, machinery, computers, and electronics. Viewed
20in the context of differing patterns of industry growth, this finding
may have different meanings for different industries: in the textiles
and machinery industries for example, two thirds of the acquirers are
outside the publicly traded manufacturing sector, so the acquistions
which we see here are a special group and are perhaps a reflection of the
improved prospects for the remaining firms after the industry has shrunk
(see Schary (1986) for a more detailed study of the long-run reaction of
firms in the textile industry to its declining profitability). In
computers and electronics, however, almost all the acquisitions are in
the manufacturing sector, specifically in closely related industries,
and the growth in R&D is perhaps another indicator that the firms
engaged in acquisition activity need to invest more rather than less in
order to exploit the value of their acquisitions.
Overall, however, there is little evidence of a significant
difference in the mean growth rates of R&D intensity between firms
involved in acquisitions and non-acquiring firms. Comparing the means
is only part of the story, however: it is possible that R&D intensities
change in different ways for different types of acquisitions in such a
way as to leave the mean growth rate unchanged. To check this, in
Figure 1, I plot the distribution of these changes for all firms in the
manufacturing sector and for the acquisitions only. These plots show
some evidence that the variance of the changes in R&D intensities are
somewhat higher for the acquisitions, and even that more of them
experience a decline than the overall sample. However, non-parametric
tests5 for the difference of the overall means of .R/S in Tables
5. I used the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test (best for the logistic distribution),
the Median Score test (best for double exponential), the Van der Waeden
213a and 3b accept equality in almost all cases (whether or not publicly
traded non-manufacturing acquisitions are excluded, whether or not zero
R&D-doers are excluded). The only case where a significant positive
difference exists is when all publicly traded firms and zero R&D-doers
are included, and here only for two of the four non-parametric tests.
The same conclusion holds when I look at three year changes around the
time of acquisition (not reported). The conclusion is that there is no
overwhelming evidence of a change in R&D behavior around the time of
acquisition by acquiring firms.
In the next section I try to quantify the determinants of
acquisition further by estimating probability models involving more than
one explanatory variable, since it is known that size is systematically
related both to R&D intensity and to the probability of being acquired,
making these tables somewhat difficult to interpret in detail.
4. Estimating the Probability of Entering the Acquisition Narket
Before I present results for the full-blown multinomial logit model
of acquisition matches, I present estimates of the "marginals" of such a
model. These estimates are not marginals of the distribution of the
multinomial logit model in the statistical sense, since they cannot be
obtained by aggregating over the choice set,6 but they summarize
test (best for normal), and the Savage test (best for exponential).
6. In the special case where there are no synergies in acquisition (the
gain is additively separable in the characteristics of i and j), these
are the true marginal probabilities of acquisition and being acquired,
but it seems unlikely that this particular model holds in these data.
Simple significance tests on the interaction terms confirm this.
22the data from the perspective of the acquiring and acquired firms
separately. They also provide an indication of the change in the sample
when I restrict the data to the approximately 300 acquisitions for which
I can actually observe both partners.
I assume that the reduced form for the probability of being
acquired in any one year can be written as a logit function of various
firm characteristics:
(14) P(i acq in year tIX.,t) —exp(48X.+a)/(l+exp(X.t+a))
where X. are the characteristics of the firm. The estimates of and
can then be obtained with a conventional maximum likelihood logit
estimation. The same type of model can also be used to estimate the
probability of firm j making an acquisition in year t, conditional on
its characteristics X.
it
The model of acquisition sketched in Section 2 uses the assets of
the firms to predict their valuation, and hence the gain from merger.
To keep things simple, I focus on two assets: capital stock (including
all plant and equipment, inventories, and other investments), and the
stock of knowledge capital. These two assets do tend to be the most
significant in a simple stock market value equation. For the buyers and
sellers in 311 transactions which took place between 1977 and 1986, I
have constructed estimates of the book value of the physical assets in
current dollars and the R&D capital held by these firms one year before
the acquisition, using methodology described in Cummins, et al (1985).
Adjustments for the effects of inflation on the book value of the
physical assets have been applied, and R&D capital has been depreciated
at a rate of fifteen percent per year (see Griliches and Mairesse (1981,
231983)). Before use, these variables are then deflated to be in 1982
dollars, using a fixed investment deflator and an R&D deflator (Cumniins
et al (1985)) respectively, since I will be pooling across years.
I estimated equation (14) using as regressors size (the log of
capital stock), the R&D stock to capital stock ratio, and a trend
variable. I also included a dummy for the more technologically oriented
industries (those with R/S greater than one percent in Table 3a) to
check whether the R&D effects were in reality industry effects. These
estimates are shown in Table 4; the first column pertains to the
complete sample of acquisitions for which data existed, while the other
columns are for two subsets: firms acquired by private or foreign firms
and firms acquired by firms in my sample (mostly manufacturing with a
few non-manufacturing firms).
The estimates for the two groups are quite different, and confirm
the findings in the simple statistics of Table 3a. For the private
acquisitions, there is a much steeper positive trend, and all the other
variables have predictive power. Size, R&D intensity, and whether the
firm is in a science-based industry have a significant negative effect
on the probability of it being acquired by a privately-held or foreign
firm. On the other hand, these variables have no effect on the
probability of it being acquired by a publicly traded manufacturing
firm. Thus, it is likely that the private acquisition activity is
targeted towards those industries and firms where growth opportunities
have already been perceived by current management as unprofitable. This
could be construed as evidence that management has cut R&D spending for
these firms in an effort to avert takeovers, but if so, they have not
been successful. It seems more likely that this activity facilitates a
needed shrinkage in the assets devoted to these particular activities.
24Without knowledge of subsequent events in these firms, it is difficult
to be more precise about the reason for this finding. What is true is
that manufacturing acquisitions seem to be indistinguishable from non-
acquired manufacturing firms.
The equation for the probability of making an acquisition is shown
in the bottom half of Table 4.I consider three different samples:
acquisitions made during the whole sample period, and then those for the
two subsets: 1976 to 1981, and 1982 to 1986. The results are
unsurprising: size is postively related to making an acquisition, and
the probability of making an acquisition rises towards the end of the
period, while R&D intensity is not important. When I focus on the two
subperiods, a difference does emerge: in the eighties, the firms making
these large acquisitions have a somewhat lower R&D intensity than the
other manufacturing firms, suggesting some substitution between R&D
performance and acquisition activity. I also included the TECH variable
in these equations, but it was completely insignificant in all periods,
so this result is not due to a shift of acquisition activity towards
non- technologically oriented industries.
5. Results for the Matching Model of Mergers
I now turn to estimates of the multinomial logit model of the match
between acquiring and acquired firms. In this version of the paper, I
confine my sample to firms which actually made acquisitions; that is,
my estimates are conditional on a firm having chosen to enter the
takeover market and describe the choice made once the firm is in the
market. A reasonable way to augment this model so that it also
describes the decision to enter the market would be to build a nested
25logit model, where the decision to make an acquisition is logically
prior to the choice of target. The estimates which I obtain here are
consistent for the lower branch of such a nested logit model (McFadden
(1978,1981)) although the interpretation of the coefficients would
change. The upper branch would be somehwat similar to the Logit model
estimated in Table 4, since it would describe the choice between making
any acquisition or making none, but it would include an additional term
corresponding to the "inclusive value" of the set of takeover candidates
available. In other words, the characteristics of the available targets
would enter in the form of a kind of index function along with the
characteristics of the acquirer.
With this caveat in mind, I now describe the application of the
Random Utility Choice model to this problem. It is well-known that when
the unobserved part of the utility function has an extreme value
distribution, the probability of a particular choice being made from a
set of alternatives has the multinomial logit form (again, see McFadden
(1973), and Manski and McFadden (1981)). It is only slightly less well-
known that any model for choice probabilities can be written in the
multinomial logit form, with the proviso that if the independence of
irrelevant alternatives assumption does not hold, characteristics of the
other choices may enter into the "utility" function associated with a
particular choice. This needs to be kept in mind, since it allows us to
view the multinomial logit model estimated here as a descriptive summary
of the data we observed, even if the underlying interpretation of the V
functions as determining acquisition probability is suspect.
The results of estimation conditional on an acquisition being made
are shown in Table 5. These are estimates of the choice model given in
equation (7), with the choice set consisting of the chosen alternative
26plus six others randomly selected from the firms in the sample that
year. In the first two columns, Model I captures the character of the
match (v(X)) very crudely with the absolute value of the difference in
size and the difference in R&D intensity of the two firms. In addition,
the size of the target and its R&D intensity enter the logit equation
(via v(X.). The second column includes a dummy for whether or not the
firms are in the same industry; it improves the explanatory power (x2(l)
183.), but does not affect the other coefficients very much. The
estimates imply that mergers which involve a large difference in size
are less likely to take place, and that mergers between firms with
differing R&D intensities are less likely to happen. Thus there is
fairly strong evidence that mergers within the manufacturing sector tend
to be between firms which are alike in their characteristics.
The next set of estimates in Table 5 are for the model (Model II)
suggested in equation (12) and they provide a richer description of the
matching taking place in the merger market: Taking the estimates in the
last column as representative, they imply an equation for the
incremental value of an acquisition to a firm of the following form:
(15) v(X) 10j +7ljl0i
+
70j
is not identified in the conditional logit model since it cancels
from the numerator and denominator of equation(7), but the other







In other words, the bidding firms value the size of the target at an
27increasing rate with respect to their own size and a decreasing rate
with respect to their R&D intensity, and, more interesting, the shadow
price for the R&D intensity of the target is an increasing function of
the size and R&D intensity of the bidding firm. This may arise partly
because of the preference for firms to acquire firms close to their own
industry, but the simple correction of controlling for the match being
in the same industry had very little effect on the magnitude of the
estimates, although it did reduce the R&D match coefficient somewhat, as
expected. Further investigation of this finding particularily within
and across industries seems warranted.
What do these estimates tell us about the valuation of the R&D
stock of the firm at the time of acquisition? Unfortunately, it is not
possible to say very much about this without making strong assumptions
about the way in which v(X.), the price paid for the acquisition, is
determined, since the estimates of the coefficients of the
characteristics of the target will contain terms from both the
v (Xi)
(e.g., -y10) and the v(X.) equation.7 This limits my ability to
interpret equations (17) beyond pointing out that the shadow value
placed on R&D capital is steeply rising with the acquiring firms R&D
intensity.
On the other hand, it is possible to know something about the price
actually paid for the assets of the firms which were acquired, and to
compare this with the preacquisition value of these assets. For the
7. I am grateful to Charles Brown, one of the discussants, for pointing out
that the identifying assumption used the first version of this paper,
is not very reasonable.
28acquisitions which actually took place, I have collected such data for
271 of the 311 acquisitions in the sample. I use the value of debt plus
equity in the year before the acquisition as the preacquisition market
value of the firm (see Cumniins et al (1985) for details). I then
collected data on the price actually paid to each holder of a share of
common stock in the acquired firm at the time of acquisition and used
the rate of return thus earned by holders of the common stock between
the year before acquisition and acquisition to update the value of debt
plus equity (assuming that the total value of the firm was increasing
along with the value of the common stock). This procedure is necessary
owing to the difficulty of valuing the claims of all stock and
bondholders at the time of exit.
Using these numbers, I estimated a valuation equation for these
271 firms in the year before acquisition and at acquisition time.The
results were
(18) log V(A,K) —+ 0.96logA +0.49(K/A)
(0.02) (0.12)
(19) log V(A,K) —+ 0.95logA +0.65(K/A)
(0.03) (0.14)
where denotes a dummy for the year in question. These equations
suggest that a firm's R&D stock is valued at a slight premium over its
value in the stock market when the firm is a candidate for takeover.
This is strikingly consistent with Addanki's (1985) findings using some
of the same data but a different model, and deserves to be investigated
further by integrating these equations into the full niultinomial logit
model of acquisition choice.
The analysis in this section has yielded two findings which bear on
29the role of R&D in acquisition activity: First, the takeover premium is
positively related to the amount of R&D capital possessed by the firm.
Second, there does seem to be a kind of matching at work in the merger
market: firms prefer to acquire firms which look more like themselves,
especially with respect to R&D intensity. This result is not one that is
easily determined from the aggregate (marginal) patterns of merger
estimated in Table 4, and this suggests that the full matching model
which I tried for the first time here may yield more information about
the merger market than we have hitherto been able to obtain. It would
be desirable to verify this result with some additional information
about the other firm characteristics which prompt takeover activity.
6. Conclusions
I began this paper with some questions about costs and benefits of
increased merger activity in the United States and suggested that
exploring the role of Research and Development activity might shed some
light on whether at least the firms involved were benefitting from the
increase. I also cited some earlier and rather inconsistent evidence on
the attractiveness of R&D in the takeover market. With respect to this
last, the richer model of acquisition which attempts to match buyers and
sellers seems to provide an explanation for some of the earlier results:
although on average acquired firms invest the same or slightly less in
R&D as the industry norm, the R&D which they do is valued more highly at
the margin by the firms which take them over. This result at least
hints that successful innovators are being taken over. In addition,
there is evidence that larger gains are generated by acquisitions where
both firms involved have high R&D intensity.
30I also found evidence that much of the acquisition activity by
private and foreign firms in the domestic market is directed towards
firms and industries which are relatively less R&D intensive and have a
weaker technological base, so that this kind of acquisition activity
cannot be a major factor in causing a shift of focus away from
innovation activity, unless we take the view that managers in these
industries saw themselves as threatened with takeover far in advance and
cut R&D spending in anticipation. Given the nature of the industries
involved, this seems somewhat unlikely. Explaining this result would
seem to require further investigation into the motives for private
acquisitions.
Finally, I found very little evidence in the existing data (through
1985) that acquisitions cause a reduction in R&D spending; in the
aggregate, firms involved in mergers showed no difference in their pre
and post-merger R&D performance over those not so involved. At the
individual industry level, the results were too imprecisely measured to
draw firm conclusions.
However, I have left many open questions which deserve further
attention: First, at the level of econometric specification, what are
the optimal regressors in such a model, the optimal sampling for the
choice set, and how do the results change when a nested logit model is
used to estimate the probability of acquisition and the probability of
the choice made. Second, can we learn more about the precise valuation
of this part of the returns to R&D by incorporated exit prices directly
into the model of acquisition probability Finally, is there more
information about the relative importance of other reasons for merger to
be gained from a more complete model of the acquisitions market using
31this framework?
32Table 1
Reasons for Exit from the Publicly Traded
Manufacturing Sector
*
Numberof Firms and Employment
Acquisition Acquisition Acquisition Liquidated
Total by Public by Private by Foreign or
Year Exits Domestic Firm Firm Firm Bankrupt
19762892 2489 1 0 2 2 2 0
197755 256 35 165 5 6 11 81 2 2
197842 243 20 204 1322 816 1 0
197933 131 23 80 514 2 7 114
198059 353 31 270 5 15 821 917
198181 323 35 220 22 58 618 1116
198267 190 23 72 2347 736 1130
198371 249 27 102 2166 3 1 10 16
1984 115 596 44 290 38 161 1074 11 10
1985 111 823 43 552 36 138 778 19 11
198658 466 23 153 15 86 852 514
** Total704 3721 332 2195 199 615 72 385 101 132
Notes:
*
Thefirst entry in each pair of columns in the number of firms, and the
second entry is the total employment (in l000s) in these firms the year
prior to exit.
**
Columnsand rows do not sum due to a few exits as yet unidentified as to
reason and/or year of exit.
33Table 2a







Number Empi. Acquired 82-86
in 81in 81 Percent % Empi.
Total Mfg 2056 18,87412.8 6.6 1831 19,43615.6 10.4
All employment figures are in thousands; they include part-time and
seasonal workers, and exclude any contract employees or consultants.
The first four columns refer to acquisitions made between 1977
a share of the industry as it existed in 1976. The next four





The number of firms acquired and the employment in those firms are shown as
a percent of the base period number of firms and employment.
34
Food 1581,75319.0 18.6 1201,77125.0 17.0
Textiles 153 996 7.2 6.1 117 83126.5 24.3
Chemicals 1031,37819.4 4.6 87 1,38210.3 9.0
Drugs 92 73910.9 4.4 99 79314.1 15.3
Petroleum 661,456 9.1 5.2 58 1,681 8.6 8.1
Rubber,Plstcs 76 708 9.2 1.0 61 54523.0 22.3
Stone,Clay,Gl 58 37317.2 8.2 47 34223.4 13.4
Prim. Metals 87 77111.5 8.0 76 79615.8 18.0
Fab. Metals 136 56513.2 5.2 115 57621.7 18.9
Engines 59 59210.2 9.6 53 570 5.7 1.5
Computers 1131,10712.4 3.0 1301,566 3.8 0.6
Machinery 157 65721.0 17.3 122 55714.8 11.2
Elec. Mach. 82 1,49214.6 7.1 841,44722.6 8.5
Electronics 192 2,000 8.3 2.6 198 2,376 7.6 5.6
Autos 77 1,35714.3 4.6 621,04119.4 10.3
Aircraft 40 82312.5 1.7 37 98421.6 9.4
Instruments 87 232 8.0 5.3 88 265 8.0 2.6
Lumber&Wood 154 916 9.7 6.1 127 82416.5 7.2
Misc Mfg 166 95711.4 5.0 1501,09118.0 10.0Table 2b
Characteristics of the Buyers and Sellers




in 1976 in 1976
Acquired 77-86 Acquiring 77-86
Number Percent Employ. % Emp. Number Percent
Total Mfg
NB: The sample consists of manufacturing acquisitions
buyer and the seller appeared on the Compustat Files.
where both the
The first two columns are totals for the manufacturing sector in 1976,
employment figures are in thousands; they include part-time and seasonal
workers, and exclude any contract employees or consultants.
All
The next four columns are totals for the firms which were acquired between 1977
and 1986. The columns labelled percent show their share of the 1976 industry,
both in number of firms, and in employment.
The final two columns describe the firms in the industry which made acquisitions
of publicly traded manufacturing firms between 1977 and 1986.
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Food 158 1,753 26 16.5% 541.5 30.9% 23 14.6%
Textiles 153 996 11 7.2% 50.0 5.0% 14 9.2%
Chemicals 103 1,378 19 18.4% 182.1 13.2% 12 11.7%
Drugs 92 739 17 18.5% 110.7 1.5% 12 13.0%
Petroleum 66 1,456 8 12.1% 164.6 11.3% 14 21.2%
Rubber,Plstcs 76 708 11 14.5% 8.2 1.1% 9 11.5%
Stone,Clay,G1 58 373 10 17.2% 31.3 8.3% 8 13.8%
Prim. Metals 87 771 12 13.8% 161.3 20.9% 5 5.7%
Fab. Metals 136 566 25 18.4% 45.7 8.1% 16 11.8%
Engines 59 592 6 10.2% 44.3 7.4% 3 5.1%
Computers 113 1,107 18 15.9% 53.4 4.8% 10 8.8%
Machinery 157 657 31 19.7% 143.9 21.9% 14 8.9%
Elec. Mach. 82 1,492 18 22.0% 131.9 8.8% 13 15.8%
Electronics 192 2,000 27 14.1% 173.0 8.9% 16 8.3%
Autos 77 1,357 6 7.8% 21.0 1.5% 11 14.3%
Aircraft 40 823 10 25.0% 89.3 10.8% 6 15.0%
Instruments 87 232 11 12.6% 18.1 7.8% 9 10.3%
Lumber&Wood 154 916 23 14.9% 71.3 7.8% 10 6.5%
Misc Mfg 166 957 25 15.1% 47.1 4.9% 11 6.6%
205618,874 314 15.3%2,088.7 11.1% 216 10.5%Table 3a
Comparison of R&D to Sales Ratios
for Acquired and Non-Acquired Firms 1977-1986
By Acquired Firm's Industry
Number R/S SR/S R/S SR/S






R/S is the deflated R&D tosales ratio. The deflator for sales is the
Producer Price Index for Finished Goods (Bureau of Labor Statistics) and
that for R&D is due to Griliches following Jaffe (see Cummins et al
(1985) for details).
The column labelled Exiters contains the average R&D to sales ratio for
the 314 firms which were acquired by firms in my sample, measured one
year before exit and the change in R&D to sales ratio for the combined
firm measured from one year before exit until one year after. The one
labelled Stayers is the average R&D to sales ratio and the growth of
that ratio for the firms which did not exit, averaged over the 1977 to
1986 period. It is based on several hundred observations per industry.
The last two columns are the difference in R/S for the two groups and
the T-statistic for the hypothesis that the difference is zero.
36
Food 26 .253% .06% .160%.01% - .093%-1.5
Textiles 11 .158 .41 .169 .02 .012 0.1










































































Electronics 27 4.07 .88 3.44 .44 - .631 -0.3
Autos 6 .782 -.12 .766 -.18 -.016 -0.0
Aircraft 10 2.12 .09 2.02 .26 - .107 -0.1
Instruments 11 4.56 .35 4.10 .43 - .455 -0.2
Lumber&Wood 23 .345 .03 .342 .32 - .004 -0.0
Misc Mfg 25 .620 .04 .340 .02 - .028 -1.6
314 1.97% .18 1.82% .16 - .154%-0.4
0.92% 1.82% -0.90 % -3.0Table 3b
Comparison of R&D to Sales Ratios
for Acquired and Acquiring Firms 1977-1986
By Acquiring Industry
Number R/S R/S LIR/S R/S Diff.
Acquired Acquired Acquiring AcquirersAvg T-stat
Food 30 .320% .209% .07% -.111% -1.1
Textiles 15 .276 .467 .49 .191 0.6
Chemicals 18 3.22 2.69 .18 -.532 -0.7
Drugs 14 7.33 4.77 .31 -2.56 -0.9
Petroleum 11 .864 .383 -.06 -.481 -1.5
Rubber,Plstcs 11 .841 .921 .11 .080 0.2
Stone,Clay,Gl 9 1.11 1.10 .12 -.017 0.0
Prim. Metals 7 .084 .204 -.02 .120 1.0
Fab. Metals 28 .849 .649 -.12 -.199 -0.6
Engines 3 1.18 2.11 .06 .935 1.1
Computers 10 6.61 5.76 .46 -.854 -0.6
Machinery 21 1.08 1.24 .52 .161 0.4
Elec. Mach. 23 3.34 2.00 .02 -1.34 -1.4
Electronics 17 3.92 4.07 1.88 .145 0.2
Autos 14 2.59 1.12 -.05 -1.47 -1.1
Aircraft 9 3.97 3.61 -.26 -.361 -0.3
Instruments 11 1.79 3.33 .12 1.54 1.9
Lumber&Wood 10 .520 .304 .01 -.215 -0.6
Misc Mfg 18 .656 .179 -.06 -.477 -1.3
Total Mfg 279 2.05 1.68 .22 -.369 -0.9
Non-Mfg 38 1.38 .168 -1.21 -3.4
Total 317 1.97% 1.50% -.472%-1.5
The two columns labelled R/S give the average R&D to sales ratio for the
acquiring firms and the firms they acquired. R/S is defined the same way as
in Table 2a.
The column labelled tSR/S is the average implied change in R/S around the
time of aquisition for acquisitions by firms in that industry.
The last two columns again test the difference between the two R/S ratios.
37Table 4
*
LogitEstimates of the Probability of Acquisition
21, 900 Observations
Probability of Being Acquired
All by Private or Foreign by Manufacturing Firms
#Acquisitions 557 229 328
Log A -.042(.022) -.166(.030) .036(.028)
K/A
-.139(.144) -.514(.314) .058(.167)
D(Tech) .232(.097) .830(.175) .146(.l22)
**
Trend .125(.0l6) .239(.028) .054(.020)
for A,K,Tech12.0 60.2 3.4
Probability of Making an Acquisition
All Years 1976-1981 1982-1986
# Acquisitions 319 167 152
Log A .432(.025) .546(.036) .320(.034)
K/A -.314(.266) .218(.340) -.994(.385)
**
Trend .027(.023) - .0l5(.049) .264(.079)
Variables:
Log K —Logof deflated capital stock of the firm in the year before it
is acquired or acquires.
K/A—Ratioof R&D stock to assets in the same year.
D(Tech)—Dummy for the Chemicals, Drugs, Engines, Computers, Machinery,
Elec. Machinery, Electronics, Aircraft, and Instruments Industries.
Notes:
*Estimates are obtained by the method of Maximum Likelihood. All
standard errors are heteroskedastic-consistent estimates.
**A dummy for 1986 was also included since the data are incomplete for
that year.
38Table 5
Conditional Logit Estimates of Acquisition Choice
311 Acquisitions: 1977-1986
Coefficient Estimates







D(Same md.) 2.34(.21) 2.41(.18)
LogA.
-.72(.14) -.73(.16) -1.13(.13) -1.21(.15)
(K/A). 3.30(.53) 3.09(.58) -2.98(0.72) -3.28(0.82)
Log of Likelihood -502.3 -424.7 -557.8 -467.2
Variables:
LogA —logof deflated assets in the year before the acquisition, where
assets is the sum of capital stock, inventories, and other
investments.




D(Samemd.) —1if acquiring and acquired firm are in the same two-digit
industry.
The subscript j indexes acquiring firms and i indexes target firms. The
coefficient estimates are for the probability that firm j chooses firm i when it
makes an acquisition. Models I and II are described more completely in the text.
Notes:
Standard error estimates are robust heteroskedastjc-consjstent estimates.
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